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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 Michael Arrington was convicted of conspiring to 
distribute heroin, among other offenses.  He filed a motion to 
 
1 We express our thanks to the Yale Law School Advanced 
Appellate Litigation Project and the supervising attorneys from 
Wiggin & Dana for taking on this matter pro bono and 
performing in an exemplary manner. 
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vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the basis that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for waiving his right to testify 
without his consent.  The District Court denied the motion.  On 
appeal, Arrington argues the Court should at least have held a 
hearing before doing so.  We agree that the District Court 
partially relied on an incorrect legal standard in denying 
Arrington’s motion without a hearing.  However, because he 
would not be entitled to a hearing even under the appropriate 
standard, we affirm. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
Arrington has a long criminal history, including 
multiple drug-trafficking convictions and parole violations 
from the 1990s and early 2000s.  He does not dispute this 
history but claims he stopped engaging in drug activity after he 
was released from prison on parole in 2007.  The Government, 
by contrast, contends Arrington quickly resumed his criminal 
activity after his release by becoming a drug supplier in 
Pennsylvania in 2008.   
 
In February 2009, the police arrested some of 
Arrington’s alleged co-conspirators.  In the wake of this arrest, 
Arrington allegedly helped some of his other associates 
attempt to escape apprehension, including by allowing two of 
them to spend the night at his home before driving them out of 
state.  From his release on parole in 2007 until this point, 
Arrington had appeared to be a “model parolee” and was 
working steadily at a car wash.  Supp. App. at 256–58, 302.  
However, after his alleged associates were arrested, he 
abandoned his parole appointments and eventually fled the 




Police subsequently arrested Arrington after he 
unsuccessfully used an alias in an effort to evade authorities.  
He was charged with possession with the intent to distribute 
controlled substances, conspiracy to do the same, and traveling 
in interstate commerce with the intent to facilitate unlawful 
activity.  He opted to go to trial, where attorney Laurence Kress 
represented him and several of his alleged co-conspirators 
testified against him.  Among other statements, these witnesses 
represented that Arrington supplied wholesale quantities of 
drugs that they would divide and sell to customers.  He 
contends there were inconsistencies and credibility issues in 
their testimony, including that one of the witnesses admitted to 
asking another witness to lie to police on one aspect of 
Arrington’s trafficking activity.  Kress repeatedly highlighted 
these issues for the jury during trial in an effort to cast doubt 
on the Government’s case. 
 
Although the District Court excluded evidence of 
Arrington’s prior convictions, it allowed the Government, for 
the purpose of proving consciousness of guilt under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), to introduce evidence that he fled 
from parole.  This evidence was discussed only a handful of 
times during trial.  Arrington claims he told Kress that he 
wanted to testify to explain that he absconded from parole not 
because of his involvement in drug trafficking, but because he 
had accumulated a variety of minor, unrelated parole violations 
and decided to run rather than face the consequences.  Kress 
did not honor this request, instead deciding that Arrington was 
not going to testify because doing so would open him to cross-
examination, which might enable the Government to diminish 
his credibility by introducing evidence of his prior convictions.  
Kress, according to Arrington, never sought his consent to 
waive his right to testify or explained that the decision was his 
5 
 
to make.  However, during his closing argument, Kress 
covered some of the material to which Arrington claims he 
would have testified, including explaining that people abscond 
from parole all the time for “different reasons that are personal 
to them.”  Supp. App. at 329.  The Government addressed the 
issue only briefly during its rebuttal closing argument, 
suggesting that Arrington’s flight from parole corroborated the 
other, and overwhelming, evidence of his guilt. 
 
After deliberating for about three hours, the jury 
convicted Arrington.  He appealed, and we affirmed.  See 
United States v. Arrington, 530 F. App’x 143 (3d Cir. 2013).  
We held, among other things, that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of his flight from 
parole for the purpose of showing his guilty conscience.  Id. at 
146. 
 
In 2014, Arrington filed a pro se motion to vacate his 
convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing, among other 
things, that Kress was ineffective for unilaterally waiving his 
right to testify.  Alongside the motion, Arrington filed a 
declaration stating that, if he had been given the opportunity, 
he would have told the jury he was innocent and explained the 
real reasons he absconded from parole.  The District Court 
denied this motion without a hearing.  Although it presumed 
all of his allegations were true and non-frivolous, it decided 
Arrington was not entitled to relief because “the result of [his] 
trial would not have changed had [he] presented the testimony 
he now proposes.”  J.A. at 25.  In the alternative, the District 
Court concluded Kress’s performance was not deficient. 
 
Arrington filed an unsuccessful motion for 
reconsideration, and then timely appealed to us.  We granted a 
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certificate of appealability on the ineffective-assistance issue 
and appointed pro bono counsel to represent him. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
   
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253(c).  On appeal, Arrington does not ask us to address the 
merits of his motion under § 2255.  He requests only that we 
decide whether the District Court erred in declining to hold a 
hearing on his motion.  We review that decision for abuse of 
discretion, United States v. Scripps, 961 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 
2020), but exercise plenary review over the Court’s underlying 
legal conclusions and review its factual findings for clear error, 




1. The Standard for Obtaining an Evidentiary 
Hearing on a § 2255 Motion  
 
We begin by clarifying the standard a district court 
should use when determining whether a hearing is necessary 
on a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Under that provision, a district court must hold a hearing 
“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2255(b).   
 
This involves a two-pronged inquiry.  First, the district 
court must “consider[] as true all appellant’s nonfrivolous 
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factual claims.”  United States v. Dawson, 857 F.2d 923, 927 
(3d Cir. 1988).  Second, it must “determine whether, on the 
existing record, those claims that are nonfrivolous conclusively 
fail to show ineffective assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 927–28.  
In evaluating claims at the second step, the test is the familiar 
one set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984), which requires a movant to show that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient and prejudiced his client’s defense.  
“If a nonfrivolous claim clearly fails to demonstrate either 
deficiency of counsel’s performance or prejudice to the 
defendant, then the claim does not merit a hearing.”  Dawson, 
857 F.2d at 928.  “If, on the other hand, a claim, when taken as 
true and evaluated in light of the existing record, states a 
colorable claim for relief under Strickland, then further factual 
development in the form of a hearing is required.”  Id.  To 
reiterate, “if a nonfrivolous claim does not conclusively fail 
either prong of the Strickland test, then a hearing must be 
held.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  This is a “reasonably low 
threshold for habeas petitioners to meet.”  United States v. 
McCoy, 410 F.3d 124, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).  
As we have observed in other contexts, “colorable legal merit 
is distinct from actual merit.”  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 
405, 413 (3d Cir. 2012) (second emphasis in original). 
 
The District Court erred in its articulation of the relevant 
standard for obtaining a hearing on a § 2255 Strickland motion.  
Although the Court partially described the correct standard at 
the outset of its opinion, it later stated it was rejecting 
Arrington’s claim in part because “the Government’s case 
against [him] was more than adequate to secure a conviction, 
even without evidence of [his] parole violation.”  J.A. at 26.  
But that describes the standard for evaluating a motion for a 
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal 
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Procedure 29, not the standard for obtaining an evidentiary 
hearing on a § 2255 Strickland motion.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 
29(a) (“[T]he court on the defendant’s motion must enter a 
judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction.”); Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. 
Dep’t of Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 599 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Strickland 
prejudice does not depend on the sufficiency of the evidence 
despite counsel’s mistakes.”).   
 
On appeal, the Government seems to suggest that, to 
warrant an evidentiary hearing, a § 2255 movant must prove 
there is a “reasonable probability” that, absent counsel’s errors, 
the trial would have had a “different result.”  Gov. Br. at 31.  
But “[t]hat misstates the appropriate standard,” McCoy, 410 
F.3d at 132, because it accelerates the timeline on which a 
movant must satisfy his burden under Strickland.   
 
To prevail on a § 2255 Strickland motion, a movant 
must prove prejudice, meaning “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.   
 
But the standard for obtaining a hearing on a § 2255 
motion is less onerous.  As noted above, the statute 
“mandate[s] . . . an evidentiary hearing,” McCoy, 410 F.3d at 
134, unless the movant’s Strickland claim fails as a “matter of 
law,” Dawson, 857 F.2d at 929.  See also Scripps, 961 F.3d at 
635 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing because we could 
not conclude “as a matter of law” whether counsel was 
ineffective).  A movant need not “prove” anything to warrant 
a hearing.  He must simply allege a set of facts that is not 
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frivolous or clearly contradicted by the record and that 
demonstrates (if assumed to be true) that he would plausibly be 
entitled to relief under Strickland.  Dawson, 857 F.2d at 927–
28.  A hearing is warranted where, for example, resolution of 
the motion turns on credibility or disputed facts, or the record 
is inconclusive about whether a movant is entitled to relief.  See 
United States v. Tolliver, 800 F.3d 138, 142–43 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(remanding for a hearing because of factual disputes between 
the parties); United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 546 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“[T]he district court abuses its discretion if it fails to 
hold an evidentiary hearing when the files and records of the 
case are inconclusive as to whether the movant is entitled to 
relief.”); Dawson, 857 F.2d at 930 (“Credibility is a question 
of fact to be decided by the finder of fact based on face-to-face 
observation.”). 
 
2. Arrington’s Claim  
 
We turn to Arrington’s claim that the District Court 
abused its discretion in declining to grant him a hearing before 
denying his § 2255 motion.  As noted, the Court partially relied 
on an incorrect legal standard in considering that claim.  
However, even under the standard articulated above, Arrington 
would not be entitled to a hearing, as his proposed testimony 
comes nowhere close to undermining confidence in the 
outcome of his trial.  His Strickland claim thus fails as a matter 
of law. 
 
First, the testimonial evidence against Arrington was 
overwhelming.  At trial, there was consistent testimony that 
Arrington supplied drugs for his co-conspirators to cut and sell.  
To the extent there were discrepancies in the witnesses’ 
accounts, they were minor.  See, e.g., Arrington Br. at 12–13 
10 
 
(noting that two witnesses provided differing accounts of 
whether one of them was present for one drug transaction).  
And while there was evidence that before trial one witness 
asked another to lie to the police about a detail—whether it was 
Arrington, or someone else, who had paid the witness to pick 
up drugs the day of her arrest—there was no evidence that the 
witness lied about any aspect of the case during her trial 
testimony.  Most importantly, Kress raised all of these issues 
in open court during trial, but the jury still decided to convict 
Arrington.   
 
Compared with the testimonial evidence, Arrington’s 
flight from parole was a minute portion of the Government’s 
case against him; it came up only a few, brief times during the 
three-day trial.  In fact, the Government did not even bother to 
make any closing arguments about Arrington’s parole absences 
until its rebuttal after Kress sua sponte raised the issue during 
his closing statement.  Even then, the Government hardly 
touched on the issue, simply suggesting that Arrington’s 
apparent consciousness of his own guilt, as demonstrated by 
his flight from parole, corroborated the profuse other evidence 
against him.  It was perhaps unsurprising that the Government 
did not rely heavily on Arrington’s flight from parole, as the 
record already contained another, much clearer, indicator that 
he had a guilty conscience: namely, his own admission, via 
stipulation, that he unsuccessfully used a false name to avoid 
arrest.  Against this backdrop, we simply cannot fathom that 
Arrington’s proposed testimony on the reason for his parole 
absences would have helped his case in any way.  
 
Second, if Arrington had testified, it would almost 
certainly have been devastating for his defense.  Cross-
examination would have been “scorching,” United States v. 
11 
 
Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 605 (5th Cir. 2012), enabling the 
Government to seek to introduce impeachment evidence of his 
prior convictions, parole violations, and drug activity.  
Moreover, his proposed testimony on the reason for his parole 
absences was internally inconsistent and could only have 
undermined his case.  Specifically, although Arrington initially 
wrote in his declaration that he did not flee parole because he 
was afraid of being indicted for drug trafficking, he then 
contradicted himself by stating that one of the reasons he fled 
was that he was scared the Government would come looking 
for him after one of his alleged co-conspirators was arrested.  
Because Arrington’s proposed testimony could not possibly 
have helped his case—indeed, we can conjure no way it would 
not have hurt him—we conclude his Strickland prejudice claim 
is not colorable.2  Thus the District Court was not required to 
hold an evidentiary hearing. 
 
2 The District Court held, in the alternative, that Arrington did 
not make adequate allegations under Strickland’s performance 
prong.  The Government does not defend this conclusion on 
appeal, and for good reason.  The declaration accompanying 
Arrington’s § 2255 motion, presumed to be true, states a 
colorable claim that Kress’s performance was deficient 
because he waived Arrington’s right to testify without consent.  
See United States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 13 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“The duty of providing . . . advice [on the right to testify] and 
of ensuring that any waiver is knowing and intelligent rests 
with defense counsel.”); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 
1525, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that defense 
counsel’s performance is deficient under Strickland if he never 
informs the defendant that the ultimate decision of whether to 
testify belongs to the defendant).  The District Court purported 




*    *    *    *    * 
 
 The bar for obtaining an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 
motion is low.  Even so, Arrington does not meet it, because 
his claim conclusively fails Strickland’s prejudice prong.  We 
therefore affirm. 
 
true and nonfrivolous, but it discredited those allegations in the 
same breath by concluding that Kress had indeed secured 
Arrington’s informed consent before waiving his right to 
testify.  J.A. at 23–25.  The record did not clearly contradict the 
allegations about Kress’s unilateral decision that Arrington not 
testify, and the Court went too far in concluding otherwise.  
However, this does not provide a basis for reversal, as 
Arrington’s claim conclusively fails Strickland’s prejudice 
prong for the reasons discussed above. 
 
